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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On June 19, 2014 the Supreme Court handed down a highly important 
opinion discussing what is considered patentable subject matter in the 
United States. The case, Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International,1 
involved a group of patents for computer software that mitigated settlement 
risk in financial transactions. The Court held that these patents were not 
drawn to patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) 
because the claims were directed toward abstract ideas, which are 
unpatentable.  
This ruling has drawn decidedly mixed reactions from commentators 
in the legal field.2 Moreover, this case leaves United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”), courts, inventors and the industry grappling 
with the question as to what is patentable. Without a clear line, these 
parties are left to guess at what inventions fit within the ambiguous bounds 
of patentability. 
 This Note explores the impact of the Alice decision and what 
standards, if any, the Court created in Alice. Part I discusses the history of 
35 U.S.C. § 101 which defines patentable subject matter, § 101’s 
application, and judge-made exceptions to patentable subject matter. Part II 
discusses the history and rise of software patents in the United States. Part 
III discusses the reasoning of the Court in Alice. Finally, Part IV discusses 
the impact of Alice, the cases that have applied Alice, and whether Alice 
will facilitate or hinder future determinations of what is eligible subject 
matter. Finally, the Note suggests options other than patenting and 
discusses how foreign countries handle patent applications for software and 
whether that could provide guidance to U.S. courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
2.  Compare Interview by Gene Quinn with Paul Michel, Retired Chief Judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal (Aug. 6, 2014) available at 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/08/06/judgemichelsaysalicedecisionwillcreateto
talchaos/id=50696/ (“[The Alice decision] will create total chaos.”) with  Justin 
Nelson, Symposium: For Patent Litigants, Court Affirms Status Quo, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Jun. 20, 2014, 1:36 P.M.), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposiumforpatentlitigantscourtaffirmsstatu
squo/ (“[The Alice decision] broke no new ground . . . and was consistent with the 
Court’s prior decisions.”). 
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I. ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER & UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW 
 
Before discussing the impact that Alice will have on the definition of 
eligible subject matter, it is important to have a general understanding of 
the contours of patent law. The United States’ patent system incentivizes 
people to invent “by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”3 Patents in 
essence create a monopoly by conferring “the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the claimed invention.”4 Because of this 
monopoly, patent law must also not be so broad as to stifle scientific and 
technological progress. For that reason, Congress has limited what is patent 
eligible, determining that a patent must consist of eligible subject matter5 
and be novel,6 nonobvious,7 and fully and particularly described.8 
Congress is explicitly given the power to grant patents by Article I of 
the Constitution.9 In order to give guidance to the USPTO, courts, and 
inventors seeking patents, Congress passed Title 35. Section 101 of that 
title states that “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.” Section 101 was passed in 1952, as a revision of the prior statute, 35 
U.S.C. § 31 (1946), which was split into the current § 101 and § 102.10 The 
language defining eligible subject matter in § 101, however, has existed 
since the founding of the United States.11 The Alice decision and the cases 
leading up to it involve the interpretation of the word “process” in § 101. 
 
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). 
4. 1-OV Chisum on Patents 1. 
5. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
6. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
7. “A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences 
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention 
as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed 
invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
8. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
9. “The Congress shall have the power to . . . promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 
10. 35 U.S.C. § 102 defines statutory novelty and states other conditions required for 
patentability. It has been occasionally argued that because § 101 contains the 
words “new and useful,” novelty is also a requirement under § 101. However, this 
argument has been soundly rejected. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 
(1981). (“Section 101, however, is a general statement of the type of subject matter 
that is eligible for patent protection ‘subject to the conditions and requirements of 
this title.’ Specific conditions for patentability follow and § 102 covers in detail the 
conditions relating to novelty.”) 
11. Patent Act of 1793, Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (“[W]hen any person or 
persons . . . shall allege that he or they have invented any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not 
known or used before the application, and shall present a petition to the Secretary 
of State, signifying a desire of obtaining an exclusive property in the same, and 
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The Court noted that because of the broad statutory language in § 101, 
Congress intended to include “anything under the sun that is made by 
man.”12 However, this does not mean that anything can constitute 
patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court has recognized three 
judicially-created exceptions to patentable subject matter: “"Laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable”13 because 
“they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work . . . and 
monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to 
impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”14 These 
exceptions have never been added to the Patent Act and continue to exist 
since their formulation as judge-made exceptions.15 
However, the Court has cautioned that “too broad an interpretation of 
this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law.”16 This is because 
the terms “laws of nature” and “abstract idea” are “vague and malleable.”17 
On another level, every patent can be said to cover a “law of nature” or an 
“abstract idea” because the claims of a patent, though bound by the 
language of the claim, must be infinite in scope,18 and characterizing the 
defining principle of a patent as a “law of nature” or “abstract idea” is 
always possible.19 
In the context of software development and computer-implemented 
business method patents, two subcategories of these exceptions are 
particularly important - laws of nature and abstract ideas/mental processes. 
These limitations place restrictions on the types of software and business 
methods that are eligible for patent protection. 
 
 
 
 
praying that a patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be lawful for the 
said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made out”)..”) 
12. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 
(1952)). 
13. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) 
(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). 
14. 134 S. Ct. at 1293. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
15. The formulation of these exceptions began in 1853 in Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 
156, 175 (1853). See 450 U.S. at 185 (List of cases tracing the development of the 
three exceptions from 1853 to 1981). 
16. 134 S. Ct. at 1293. 
17. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 135 (1948). 
18. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of 
Enablement, 23 Berkley Tech. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008); Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. 
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1908) ("The principle of the invention is a 
unit, and invariably the modes of its embodiment in a concrete invention may be 
numerous and in appearance very different from each other.") (quoting Robinson 
on Patents § 485); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) ("The 
primary meaning of the word 'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to 
the inventor's conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea."). 
19. See 134 S. Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest 
upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). 
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A. Laws of Nature 
 
 Laws of nature are not considered patentable subject matter because 
“manifestations of laws of nature [are] free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none."20 Even if someone discovers a formerly unknown 
phenomenon of nature she is unable to obtain a patent on it unless she 
applies “the law of nature to a new useful and end.”21 This is because laws 
of nature are not new inventions, processes, or products; they are a 
preexisting truth. One of the earliest cases to succinctly state this principle 
was O’Reilly v. Morse22 which stated that “[t]he mere discovery of a new 
element, or law, or principle of nature, without any valuable application of 
it to the arts, is not the subject of a patent."23 
 
B. Abstract Ideas/Mental Processes 
 
 Abstract ideas are the broadest, most general unpatentable subject 
matter; however, they are also the hardest to define. The most basic 
statement of this idea, which has been around for over a century, is that “an 
idea [in and] of itself is not patentable.”24 This exception has an underlying 
public policy because “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; 
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim 
in either of them an exclusive right."25 Yet, this basic principle is not very 
helpful because at a certain level every patent covers of an idea. The Court 
has provided some guidance by stating that “while a scientific truth, or the 
mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and 
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may 
be.”26 The question then becomes at what point does an idea cross the 
threshold to become a patentable invention. It at least takes more than 
simply stating a law of nature and adding the words “apply it.”27 
 
1. The Supreme Court Patent-Eligibility Trilogy 
 
The Supreme Court did provide some guidance regarding this question 
in the case Gottschalk v. Benson.28 The patent claimed a method of 
 
20. 333 U.S. at 130. 
21. Id. See also De Forest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co., 283 U.S. 664, 684-85 
(1931) (“It is method and device which may be patented and not the scientific 
explanation of their operation.”); Camerson Septic Tank Co. v. Saratoga Springs, 
159 F. 453, 463 (2d Cir. 1908) (“The process is one which puts a force of nature 
into a certain specified condition and then uses it in that condition for a practical 
purpose.”) 
22. 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
23. 56 U.S. at 134 (Grier, J., dissenting). 
24. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874). 
25. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (U.S. 1853). 
26. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 
27. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012). 
28. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
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programming a general-purpose digital computer to convert binary-coded 
decimal numerals into pure binary numerals. The claims, however, were 
not limited to any particular art or technology and in fact could be 
performed mentally through use of a table.29 The Court noted that the 
“[independent] claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known 
and unknown uses of the . . . conversion.”30 The claims lacked any 
limitation tying the patent to a particular machine, causing the Court, in 
considering the patentability of a process claim, to look to whether there 
was transformation and reduction of an article “to a different state or 
thing.”31 The Court held that the claimed invention was unpatentable 
because “the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and 
in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”32  
 The Court considered a patent application claiming a mathematical 
formula again in Parker v. Flook.33 The patent there claimed a 3-step 
method of updating alarm limits.34 The only difference between 
conventional methods of updating and the patent’s method of updating was 
the algorithm. The Court noted that although the claims “cover[ed] a broad 
range of potential uses of this method[,] [t]hey do not, however, cover 
every conceivable application of the formula.”35 This differentiates the 
claims from those in Benson which covered all uses of the algorithm. 
However, “[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how 
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle 
into a patentable process exalts form over substance.”36 The Court held that 
the claimed invention was unpatentable, not because it contained a 
mathematical algorithm as one component, but “because once that 
 
29. Id. at 66-67 (table showing the conversion from decimal numbers 0 to 10 to 
corresponding Pure Binary numbers and an example of the conversion). 
30. Id. at 68 (noting that the end use could “vary from the operation of a train to 
verifications of drivers’ licenses to researching the law books for precedents” and 
that it could be “performed through any existing machinery or future devised 
machinery or without any apparatus.”) 
31. Id. at 70. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted this 
so called machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for determining 
patentability. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Supreme 
Court however warned that while this test “is a useful and important clue . . . but 
[it] is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 
‘process.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010). 
32. Id. at 72. The Court defined an algorithm as a “procedure for solving a given type 
of mathematical problem.” 409 U.S. at 65. 
33. 437 U.S. 584 (1978)). 
34. The steps were: 1) measuring the present value of the process variable, 2) using an 
algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-limit value, and 3) adjusting the alarm 
limit to the updated value. 437 U.S. at 585. 
35. Id. at 586 (Finding that the claims covered any use of Flook’s formula to update 
“the value of the alarm limit on any process variable involved in a process 
comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.”) 437 U.S. at 586. 
36. Id. at 590. See also In re Application of Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 
1977) (“[I]f a claim is directed essentially to a method of calculating, using a 
mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose, the claimed 
method is nonstatutory.”). 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 7 · 2016  
Alice: The Status Quo or Total Chaos 
126 
algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered 
as a whole, contains no patentable invention.”37 This is because “[e]ven 
though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be well 
known, an inventive application of the principle may be patented . . . [but], 
the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is 
some other inventive concept in its application.”38 
 The next case in this line, Diamond v. Diehr,39 provided further 
guideposts regarding whether abstract ideas are patentable. The patent 
claimed a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured 
precision products.40 The Court determined that because the patent 
involved the process of transforming an article, specifically raw, uncured 
synthetic rubber, it was a type of process that was historically patentable. 
The patent, like those in Gottschalk and Flook, did not include claims 
directed to particular machines. However, unlike those two cases, the 
patentee did not seek to patent a mathematical formula; instead he sought 
to protect a process of curing synthetic rubber.41 The Court emphasized that 
patent claims must be considered as a whole.42 Concluding that because 
there was no “attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather . . . an 
industrial process for molding of rubber products,” the patent fell within 
eligible subject matter.43 
 
2. Bilski Era 
 
 Three decades passed before the Court decided the next case regarding 
the eligibility of software for patent protection. In Bilski v. Kappos, decided 
in 2010,44 the patent claimed a procedure for instructing buyers and sellers 
on how to protect against the risk of price fluctuations in a discrete section 
of the economy.45 Claim 1 described “a series of steps instructing how to 
hedge risk” while claim 4 put the concepts of claim 1 into a mathematical 
formula. 
 
37. Id. at 594. 
38. Id. at 594. 
39. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
40. The process involved measuring the actual temperature inside the mold and 
automatically feeding these measurements into a computer which calculated the 
cure time using the Arrhenius equation. The process determined the time the mold 
needed to cure and when the press surrounding the mold could then be opened. 
41. Id. at 187 (“[T]hey seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in 
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process.”). 
42. Id. at 188 (“It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and 
then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly 
true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be 
patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known 
and in common use before the combination was made.”). 
43. Id. at 192-93. 
44. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
45. Id. at 598-99 (“[It] explains how buyers and sellers of commodities in the energy 
market can protect, or hedge, against the risk of price changes.”). 
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 The In re Bilski46 case resulted in a five-way split of the ten member 
appellate court.47 The majority determined that a number of previous § 101 
tests used by the Federal Circuit were inadequate or unclear in 
application,48 and that the “machine-or-transformation” test should be used 
to determine § 101 eligible subject matter patentability. The court noted 
that “adding a data-gathering step to an algorithm is insufficient to convert 
that algorithm into a patent-eligible process.”49 The majority decision 
found that “the language of claim 1 does not limit any process step to any 
specific machine or apparatus” and, therefore, the question of 
transformation must be determined.50 It concluded that the patent failed the 
“machine-or-transformation” test because “claim 1 does not involve the 
transformation of any physical object or substance, or an electronic signal 
representative of any physical object or substance.”51 Rather, “the claimed 
process here as a whole is directed to the mental and mathematical process 
of identifying transactions that would hedge risk.”52 The concurring 
opinion did not differ from the majority but was written only in response to 
the three dissenting opinions. 
 Circuit Judge Newman’s dissent found that the majority’s redefinition 
of “process” created uncertainty in the patent system and misinterpreted the 
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. Judge Newman 
disagreed that the patent was outside the reach of § 101.53 In his dissent, 
Circuit Judge Mayer argued that the “machine-or-transformation” test was 
unhelpful54 and that giving patent protection to business methods lacks 
constitutional and statutory support.55 In the third dissenting opinion, 
Circuit Judge Rader found the majority’s conclusion disrupted settled 
 
46. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
47. The majority opinion filed by Chief Judge Michel joined by Circuit Judges Lourie, 
Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost, and Moore; concurring opinion filed by 
Circuit Judge Dyk and joined Circuit Judge Linn; dissenting opinion filed by 
Circuit Judge Newman; dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Mayer; and 
dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Rader. 
48. 545 F.3d at 958-61 (These include the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, the “useful, 
concrete, and tangible result” inquiry, the “technological arts test,” and the 
“physical steps” test). 
49. Id. at 963. (“A requirement simply that data inputs be gathered--without specifying 
how--is a meaningless limit on a claim to an algorithm because every algorithm 
inherently requires the gathering of data inputs.”). 
50. Id. at 962. 
51. Id. at 964. 
52. Id. at 965. 
53. Id. at 976. “These new uncertainties not only diminish the incentives available to 
new enterprise, but disrupt the settled expectations of those who relied on the law 
as it existed.” 545 F.3d at 977; “[T]he court's redefinition is contrary to statute and 
to explicit rulings of the Supreme Court and this court.” 545 F.3d at 977. 
54. “The Majority's proposed ‘machine-or-transformation test’ for patentability will do 
little to stem the growth of patents on non-technological methods and ideas.” 545 
F.3d at 1008. 
55. 545 F.3d at 999 (“Because there is nothing in the language of the 1952 Act, or its 
legislative history, to indicate that Congress intended to modify the rule against 
patenting business methods, we must presume that no change in the rule was 
intended.”). 
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principles of law because it was based too heavily on dicta taken out of 
context from Supreme Court opinions from another era.56 
 The Supreme Court responded to this fractured decision with a 
surprisingly short unanimous decision seeking to maintain a flexible patent 
jurisprudence.57 It achieved this goal by rejecting the “machine-or-
transformation” test as the exclusive or exhaustive test for eligible subject 
matter, concluding that it is a useful and important clue.58 It did this for a 
number of reasons, including statutory interpretation,59 Supreme Court 
patent jurisprudence,60 and, most importantly, the need to adapt patent law 
to ever changing and unforeseen technology.61 The Court, however, was 
quick to take a hands-off approach to clarifying what is eligible subject 
matter and it left little, if any, guidance to federal courts, inventors, or 
examiners.62 
 The Court did, however, reject the argument that business methods 
were per se not a “process” under § 101.63 This was because of the text of § 
100(b),64 the existence of federal law in 35 U.S.C. § 273,65 and the canons 
of statutory interpretation.66  
 
56. Id. at 1011 (“[T]his court . . . links patent eligibility to the age of iron and steel at a 
time of subatomic particles and terabytes.”). 
57. The Majority opinion was a mere 20 pages. 
58. 561 U.S. at 604. 
59. Id. at 603. Section 100(b) states that “’process’ means process, art or method, and 
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of 
matter, or material” and there is no common meaning of process, art, or method 
that would “require these terms to be tied to a machine or to transform an article.” 
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012). 
60. Id. at 604. See 409 U.S. at 70 (“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ’to a 
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process.”); 437 U.S. at 
588 (“a valid process patent may issue even if it does not meet [the machine-or-
transformation test].”). 
61. Id. at 605. “[T]he machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to the 
patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions 
based on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital 
signals.” 
62. Id. at 606 “In the course of applying the machine-or-transformation test to 
emerging technologies, courts may pose questions of such intricacy and refinement 
that they risk obscuring the larger object of securing patents for valuable 
inventions without transgressing the public domain.” See also 561 U.S. at 606. 
(“[T]he Court today is not commenting on the patentability of any particular 
invention, let alone holding that any of the [possible] technologies from the 
Information Age should or should not receive patent protection.”; “[P]atent law 
faces a great challenge in striking the balance between protecting inventors and not 
granting monopolies over procedures that others would discover by independent, 
creative application of general principles. Nothing in this opinion should be read to 
take a position on where that balance ought to be struck.”) 
63.  Id. at 606-10. 
64. “The Court is unaware of any argument that the ‘ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning,’ of ‘method’ excludes business methods. Nor is it clear how far a 
prohibition on business method patents would reach, and whether it would exclude 
technologies for conducting a business more efficiently.” 561 U.S. at 607 (quoting 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)). 
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 Ultimately, the Court held that the application was an attempt to patent 
abstract ideas because it sought to patent the concept of hedging risk and its 
application to energy markets. Some of its claims were mere explanations 
of the basic concept of hedging or protecting against risk which were then 
reduced to a mathematical formula. Ultimately, the Court held that 
“[a]llowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would preempt use of this 
approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an 
abstract idea.”67 The mere fact that the claims were limited to the one field, 
like Flook, was not enough to make the idea patentable. 
 
II. HISTORY OF SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY 
 
The USPTO has a history of being reluctant to grant patents on 
inventions relating to computer software.  
 
A. The 1960’s-1970’s 
 
During the 1960’s, the USPTO avoided giving patents to inventions 
that utilized a calculation made by a computer, generally holding that the 
U.S. patent system explicitly excluded mathematical laws (and therefore 
computer programs). In fact, in 1968, the USPTO released guidelines for 
computer-related patents that formalized this exclusion.68 Under these 
guidelines an invention related to a computer program could only be 
patented if it was combined with other nonobvious elements to produce 
some sort of physical result.69 These guidelines were routinely challenged 
by applicants. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) 
rejected parts of these guidelines. Its attitude was that a new program turns 
a computer into a new machine and if the claim included both the computer 
and software, it should be considered eligible subject matter.70 
 
65. See § 273(b)(1) (which allows an alleged infringer of “a method in [a] patent” to 
assert the defense of prior use); § 273(a)(3) (which states that for purposes of that 
defense, method is defined as “a method of doing or conducting business.”). 
66. There exists a canon of statutory interpretation that states that interpretation of any 
statutory provision in a manner that would render another provision superfluous 
should be avoided. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 304 (2009) (“a 
statute should be construed to give effect to all its provisions, so that no part will 
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.") (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 
U.S. 88, 101 (2004)) [Removed brackets]; Hague v. Committee for Industrial 
Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 529-530 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.). 
67. 561 U.S. at 611-12. 
68. BITLAW, “The History of Software Patents: From Benson, Flook, and Diehr to 
Bilski and Mayo v. Prometheus” (last viewed Mar. 1, 2015) available at 
http://www.bitlaw.com/software-patent/history.html. See also Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, “Patents, Innovation, and Economic 
Performance” page 140 n. 31. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 7 · 2016  
Alice: The Status Quo or Total Chaos 
130 
It was under these guidelines that the very first software patent was 
granted in 1968.71 This patent related to a sorting system. The patent 
described a heretofore unknown algorithm for sorting large datasets stored 
on magnetic tapes. It claimed the actions of the coordinated tape drives in 
addition to the algorithmic process. The act of granting this patent would 
open the floodgates to software patents leading to the rise of Microsoft.72 
The Supreme Court did not wade into the battle over the eligibility of 
software programs for a number of years. It finally decided to answer this 
question in 1972. The Court answered with a resounding “no,” holding that 
software by itself, untethered from any specific machine, was 
unpatentable.73 The Court again, only a few years later, reinforced this 
response, holding that tacking known steps onto the end of algorithm does 
not make the algorithm patentable.74 
 
B. The 1980’s 
 
However, in the 1980’s the Supreme Court forced the USPTO to 
change its stance on the issue. In 1981, the Supreme Court ordered the 
USPTO to grant a patent on a software program in Diehr. The Court did so 
because the algorithm was used to “transform” the product, even though 
the only new feature this invention had was the timing process the 
computer controlled.75 This case led to uncertainty for inventors and 
examiners in determining when algorithms cross the magic line to become 
patentable. In fact, the 1981 case included a vigorous dissent arguing that 
such confusion was the only inevitable result.76 The only thing left clear 
after these series of cases was that the eligibility of a software program for 
patent protection relied heavily on careful claim construction by a patent 
attorney.   
During this period of Supreme Court involvement the CCPA struggled 
to establish a workable test following the Court’s decisions. Beginning in 
In re Freeman77 in 1978 and stretching to In re Meyer78 in 1982, the CCPA 
 
71. U.S. Patent No. 3,380,029 (issued Apr. 23, 168). 
72. See Charles Arthur, “Software Patents ‘a bit of a mess’ says Martin Goetz, the First 
Man to get one” THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2013) (“[The granting] marked a 
watershed that would eventually lead to the rise of Microsoft, and then to the 
"smartphone patent wars" that have been fought out between Apple, Samsung, 
Motorola, Microsoft, HTC and Google.”) 
73. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 63. 
74. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
75. BITLAW “The History of Software Patents: From Benson, Flook, and Diehr to 
Bilski and Mayo v. Prometheus” (last viewed Mar. 1, 2015) available at 
http://www.bitlaw.com/software-patent/history.html. 
76. “[This case aggravates the problem that] the cases considering the patentability of 
program-related inventions do not establish rules that enable a conscientious patent 
lawyer to determine with a fair degree of accuracy which, if any, program-related 
inventions will be patentable.” 450 U.S. at 219 (Stevens J., dissenting). 
77. 573 F.2d 1237, 197 USPQ 464 (CCPA 1978). 
78. 688 F.2d 789, 215 USPQ 193 (CCPA 1982). 
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formed a two-step test, called the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test, 79 hoping to 
alleviate the problem of eligibility uncertainty left in the wake of the string 
of Court cases. The first step asked whether a claim recited, directly or 
indirectly, a formula, “mental step,” or mathematical algorithm.80 If so, the 
second step involved determining whether the claim involves application of 
the algorithm to a specific element or process.81 Then, in late 1982, the 
Federal Circuit was established, replacing the CCPA, and taking away 
jurisdiction for patent cases from the regional Circuit Courts. 
 
C. The 1990’s 
 
Desperately seeking to provide some guidance on this issue, the 
Federal Circuit stepped into the fray. The Federal Circuit is the highest 
court in the land for patent matters, other than the Supreme Court.82 The 
Federal Circuit, however, struggled with the same problems regarding 
algorithms that the CCPA was grappling with in the wake of Gottschalk 
and its progeny.83 The first significant appellate decision on the matter 
 
79. It was named after three CCPA cases from the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. 
80. This step is fraught with ambiguity itself. The courts have had issue deciding what 
constitutes an “algorithm.” See In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 1379, 33 USPQ2d 
1194, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacated & remanded, 60 F.3d 807, 35 USPQ2d 1570 
(Fed. Cir. 1995), (“Although the claimed process is not expressed in terms of a 
mathematical formula, application of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is more 
refined than this simple determination. Our precedent also recognizes that ‘[w]ords 
used in a claim operating on data to solve a problem can serve the same purpose as 
a formula.’”) (quoting In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 12 USPQ2d 1824 n.1 (1989)); In 
re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 201 USPQ 136 (CCPA 1979) (method of determining 
a set of values for use in a mathematical model of a microwave circuit is an 
algorithm); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 214 USPQ 673 (CCPA 1982) (method of 
controlling the internal operation of a computer is not an algorithm even when 
application’s specification described the method as an “algorithm.”). 
81. Like Step One of the test, this step is prone to ambiguity, contracting and 
expanding over time. Compare In re Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245 (looking to claim 
preemption, “whether [the claim] in its entirety wholly preempts that algorithm.”) 
with In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 205 USPQ 397, 407 (CCPA 1980) (restating 
it in terms other than preemption, “[i]f it appears that the mathematical algorithm is 
implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships between the 
physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim 
steps (in process claims), the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes 
muster under § 101. If, however, the mathematical algorithm is merely presented 
and solved by the claimed invention, as was the case in Benson and Flook, and is 
not applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps, no amount of 
post-solution activity will render the claim statutory; nor is it saved by a preamble 
merely reciting the field of use of the mathematical algorithm.”) 
82. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “Court Jurisdiction” 
available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last 
viewed Mar. 2, 2015). 
83. See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374, 12 USPQ2d 1908 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(“every step-by-step process, be it electronic or chemical or mechanical, involves 
an algorithm in the broad sense of the term.”); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 12 
USPQ2d 1824 (1989) (A method for choosing a set of optimal microwave circuit 
elements is a mathematical algorithm); Alco Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley 
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involving an approved patent, and not a patent application itself, occurred 
in 1992.84 The court held that because it had the steps of “’converting,’ 
‘applying,’ ‘determining,’ and ‘comparing’ [which] are physical process 
steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into another,”85 this 
patent goes to eligible subject matter.86 The court sought to clear up more 
of the confusion regarding algorithms summarizing Supreme Court 
precedent up to that time as asking “whether the invention or discovery for 
which an award of patent is sought is more than just a discovery in abstract 
mathematics.” 87 Concluding that “[w]here the invention or discovery is 
only of mathematics, the invention or discovery is not the ‘kind’ of 
discovery the patent law was designed to protect and even the most 
narrowly drawn claim must fail.”88 
One of the cases decided by the Federal Circuit that provided guidance 
during this tumultuous decade was In re Lowry.89 The case involved a 
patent application for storage, use, and management of information in a 
computer memory. The application was rejected by the examiner as 
nonstatutory subject matter. This finding was reversed by the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”) that found it statutory, but 
proceeded to use the “printed matter exception”90 to deny the data 
structures any patentable weight for the § 102 and § 103 inquiry. The 
Federal Circuit reversed this decision, finding that the “printed matter 
exception” applies only to “arrangements of printed lines or characters, 
useful and intelligible only to the human mind.”91 Since data structures 
(and computer programs) are read by a computer and not the mind, the 
printed matter exception did not apply here. Therefore the court suggested 
 
Authority, 808 F.2d 1490, 1496 1 USPQ2d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[t]he inclusion 
in a patent of a process that may be performed by a person, but that also is capable 
of being performed by a machine, is not fatal to patentability.”) In re Schrader, 22 
F.3d 290, 293 30 USPQ2d 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (a mathematical algorithm was 
implicit in the claim to an auction method because the claim involves determining 
the optimal combination of bids and “is within or similar to a class of well-known 
mathematical optimization procedures commonly applied to business problems 
called linear programming.”). 
84. See Arryhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 22 
USPQ2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (the invention involved an analysis of 
electrocardiographic signals in order to determine characteristics of the heart 
function). 
85. 958 F.2d at 1059. See also 958 F.2d at 1059 (“[The] claimed method comprises an 
otherwise statutory process whose mathematical procedures are applied to physical 
process steps.”). 
86. The Federal Circuit seems to apply a machine-or-transformation test here relying 
on the “transformation” of electrical signals to determine eligibility. 
87. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
88. Id. 
89. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
90. The exception asks “whether there exists any new and unobvious functional 
relationship between the printed matter and the substrate" and if not “the printed 
matter must be considered [but] it may not be entitled to [any] patentable weight.” 
In re Gulack, 703 F.3d 1381, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
91. 32 F.3d at 1583 (quoting In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399, 163 USPQ 611, 615 
(CCPA 1969)). 
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that memory that contains a data structure is eligible subject matter and 
should be considered in determining novelty and non-obviousness. 
The Federal Circuit provided further guidance going into the new 
millennium in the case State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group Inc.92 in 1998. The patent involved the use of a “Hub and 
Spoke” computer structure for managing mutual funds.93 The court 
continued the use of some variation of a useful application test for 
determining the patentability of a mathematical algorithm.94 The court also 
noted that use of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in its current state was 
becoming untenable95 and that it “has little, if any, applicability to 
determining the presence of statutory subject matter.”96 The court focused 
on the fact that the software produced a useful, concrete, and tangible result 
in determining that the “Hub and Spoke” computer structure was claiming 
eligible subject matter.97 
This line of cases established that, at least in the 1990’s, a software 
program was eligible for patent protection as long as the program was 
controlling a computer or was stored on computer-readable media and 
produced a useful, concrete, and tangible result. These requirements were 
easy to meet during the drafting stage of patent claims and did not present 
much of an impediment to patentability. 
 
D. The 2000’s 
 
 Having done away with the confusing Freeman-Walter-Abele test, the 
Federal Circuit and the District Courts were left searching for a new means 
of determining subject matter eligibility. 
 The Federal Circuit finally settled on the “machine-or-transformation 
test” as the sole test in the case In re Bilski98 in 2008. The court settled on 
this test after again dismissing the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, adding the 
final nail in the coffin for that test, and tersely dismissing the “useful, 
concrete, and tangible result test” from State Street.99 The newest test had a 
two parts: the applicant had to show that the claimed patent 1) was either 
tied to a particular machine or 2) transformed an article from one state to 
another.  
 
 
 
 
 
92. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
93. The method involved mutual funds (Spokes) pooling their assets in an investment 
portfolio (Hub) which is organized as a partnership. See 149 F.3d at 1370. 
94. See 149 F.3d at 1373 (“[T]o be patentable an algorithm must be applied in a 
‘useful’ way.”). 
95. See Id. at 1374 n.5 (“The test has been the source of much confusion.”). 
96. Id. at 1374. 
97. Id. at 1375. 
98. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
99. Id. 
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E. The 2010’s 
 
However, any certainty provided by this decision was quickly lost 
when the Supreme Court decided Bilski v. Kappos.100 The Court rejected 
the “machine-or-transformation test” as the sole test for patentability, 
holding that it is merely a clue to eligibility. What other “clues” an 
examiner, inventor, drafter, or court should look to were left unenumerated. 
The Court also proceeded to lump “laws of nature,” “natural phenomena,” 
and “abstract ideas” into a nebulous category referred to as “fundamental 
principles.”101 This decision has been met with skepticism,102 
uncertainty,103 and confusion.104 
In response to the logic applied by the Supreme Court in Bilski and 
seeking to provide some form of guidance during the tumultuous time post-
Bilski, the USPTO released to patent examiners and the public-at-large an 
Interim Guidance Report for determining eligibility.105 This Guidance lists 
a number of factors and sub-factors that patent examiners should address 
when determining eligibility for process claims. Not looking to reverse 
years of established eligibility determinations using the “machine-or-
transformation” test that the Guidance made the most thorough factor, with 
the highest number of sub-factors, weighing toward eligibility the 
“[r]ecitation of a machine or transformation (either express or inherent).”106 
As well, the BPAI continued to largely rely on the “machine-or-
transformation” test in determining whether a claim is drawn to an abstract 
idea.107 
 
100. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
101. 545 F.3d at 952, n.5. 
102. See Chisum on Patents § 1.03[6][m] (“Bilski is a remarkably inconclusive 
contribution to the law on patent-eligible subject matter.”) 
103. See Andrew T. Spence & Kimberly B. Gatling, “Uncertainy Abounds: Patentable 
Subject Matter Almost Two Years after Bilski v. Kappos” Bloomberg BNA’s 
Patent, Trademark, & Copyright Journal 83 PTCJ 501 (Feb. 10, 2012) available at 
http://www.smithmoorelaw.com/files/upload/SpenceGatling.pdf; Michael Risch, 
“Bilski and (Thankfully) Continued Uncertainty in Patentable Subject Matter” 
PrawfsBlawg (Jun. 28, 2010 at 12:55 PM) available at 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/06/bilski-and-thankfully-
continued-uncertainty-in-patentable-subject-matter.html. 
104. See Jerrold E. Fink & Jiri Mestecky, “Bilski v. Kappos: Patent Protection for the 
Information Age?” Masuda Funai (Mar. 30, 2011) available at 
http://www.masudafunai.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=6416. (“[T]he Court's 5 to 4 
ruling settles very little and creates further uncertainties and confusion not only for 
future patent applicants, but also for those whose applications are now pending.”). 
105. “Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims 
in View of Bilski v. Kappos,” 75 Fed. Reg. 43, 922 (Jul. 27, 2010) available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_27jul20
10.pdf. 
106. Ibid. at 43, 927 (Recitation of a machine or transformation (either express or 
inherent) includes six subfactors compared with a total of five subfactors for all the 
other categories combined). 
107. See Ex Parte Frank A. Hunleth, et al., No. 2009-5621, 2010 Pat. App. LEXIS 
17747, 1-2 (Nov. 10, 2010) (applying the “machine-or-transformation” test and 
rejecting as unpatentable "a system and method for a framework for organizing, 
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The Federal Circuit has also struggled in the post-Bilski era. One of the 
first cases to apply Bilski in the Federal Circuit, Research Corp. 
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,108 concerned the issue of “digital 
image halftoning.” The court found this application was outside the laws of 
nature or physical phenomena exception, but may be within the abstract 
idea exception. It concluded that the claimed “digital image halftoning” 
was patent eligible subject matter.109 Noting that the Court in Bilski refused 
to define abstract ideas, the court also decided not to define the term except 
in the broadest language possible.110 Using broad language, the court 
“perceiv[ed] nothing abstract in the subject matter of the processes,”111 
even though the claimed method incorporated algorithms and formulas that 
controlled halftoning. The court relied on Diehr and held that the claims 
must be considered as a whole and the inventors sought patent protection 
for a process of halftoning in computer applications. 
The Federal Circuit considered abstract ideas only a short time later in 
Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc..112 The patent concerned 
detecting credit card fraud in internet transactions. The court found that the 
patent claims were directed to ineligible subject matter.113 The court 
showed less trepidation toward finding something to illustrate an abstract 
idea, providing a slightly more concrete definition.114 The court 
distinguished Research Corp. because the method there required the 
manipulation of computer data structures and output of a modified data 
structure. In Cybersource, the entire method could be performed by the 
human mind.115 
 
selecting and launching media items”). See also Joseph A. Herndon and Nicole 
Grimm “Patentability of Process Claims and Business Method Inventions with No 
“Machine or Transformation” Volume 9 Snippets Issue 4, McDonnell Boehnen 
Hulbert & LLP, 4 (Fall 2011) (“Generally, the BPAI has found valid very few 
claims that lack a specific recitation of a machine or transformation.”) available at 
http://www.mbhb.com/files/FirmService/9750fb27-58ec-4dc9-a87a-
d7be1f65cce1/Presentation/ceSnippetIssue/Snippets%20Vol%209%20Issue%204_
111411-FINAL.pdf. 
108. Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
109. Ibid. at 869 (“[T]he inventions claimed in the . . . patents are directed to patent-
eligible subject matter.”). 
110. Ibid. at 868 “[This court] will not presume to define ‘abstract’ beyond the 
recognition that this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly 
as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the 
statutory context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the 
rest of the Patent Act.” 
111. Ibid. at 868. 
112. 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
113. Id. at 1376-77 (“Because [the] claims . . . attempt to capture unpatentable mental 
processes (i.e., abstract ideas), they are invalid under § 101.”). 
114. Id. at 1373 (“[A] method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely 
an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.”). 
115. Id. at 1376 (“[T]he method consists of only the general approach of obtaining 
information about credit card transactions utilizing an Internet address and then 
using that information in some undefined manner to determine if the credit card 
transaction is valid.”). 
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The Federal Circuit again distinguished its precedent in Ultramercial, 
LLC v. Hulu, LLC.116 There the patent claimed a method for distributing 
copyrighted products over the internet for free in exchange for watching an 
advertisement and the advertiser paying for the copyrighted content. The 
court found that using advertising “as a form of currency is abstract,” but 
the patent “claims a particular method of monetizing copyrighted 
products.”117 Ultimately concluding that the patent was directed to eligible 
subject matter, the court found the interaction with consumers via the 
internet to be “something far removed from purely mental steps” and 
therefore distinguishable from Cybersource.118 The court also relied on the 
fact that “[m]any of these steps are likely to require intricate and complex 
computer programming.”119 It noted that the patent “disclose[d] a practical 
application” of this idea with concrete steps for implementation.120 The 
court also seemed to hint that a programed computer could be considered a 
“particular machine” for the practical application requirement121 relying on 
public policy.122 
The Federal Circuit relied on Bilski and Ultramercial in finding a 
patent claiming a computer-aided method and system for processing credit 
application over electronic networks was directed to unpatentable subject 
matter. The patent was considered akin to the one rejected in Bilski because 
it went to the abstract idea of a clearinghouse.123 The court distinguished 
Ultramercial, finding that the use of the words “computer-aided” without 
any specificity of the level or detail of computer involvement did not meet 
the practical application with concrete steps reasoning used in 
Ultramercial.124 
One important point that coalesced during this period was the reliance 
by the Federal Circuit on the part played by the computer in a patent. A 
succinct statement of this idea is that “[i]n order for the addition of a 
[computer] to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must 
play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, 
rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a 
solution to be achieved more quickly.”125 
 
116. 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, vacated and remanded sub nom. 
WildTangent v. Ultramercial, LLC, for reconsideration in light of Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), aff’d 
on remand, 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
117. Id. at 1328. 
118. Id. at 1329. 
119. Id. at 1328. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1329 (“[A] programmed computer contains circuitry unique to that 
computer.”). 
122. Id. (“Far from abstract, advances in computer technology—both hardware and 
software—drive innovation in every area of scientific and technical endeavor.”). 
123. DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
124. Ibid. at 1334. 
125. Sirf Tech., Inc. v. ITC, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010). See also Bancorp 
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (“To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible process, a computer must be 
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III. THE ALICE DECISION 
 
It was in this strange, uncertain, and often conflicting time that the 
Alice decision arose. The patents at issue were a family of patents owned 
by the Alice Corporation.126 Of these patents, Alice Corporation was 
granted the first one in 1999 and the fourth and final one in 2010. The 
patents concern “the management of risk relating to specified, yet 
unknown, future events.”127 More particularly the patent went to “a 
computerized trading platform used for conducting financial transactions in 
which a third party settles obligations between a first and a second party so 
as to eliminate counterparty or settlement risk.”128 The patents claim (1) the 
method for exchanging obligations (the asserted method claim),129 (2) a 
computer system organized for implementing the method for exchanging 
obligations (the systems claim),130 and (3) a computer-readable medium 
 
integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person 
making calculations or computations could not.”); Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master 
Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317 (simply adding a computer limitation to abstract 
concept claims was an insignificant post-solution activity). 
126. The family had four patents: U.S. Patents 5,970,479 (the “’479 patent”), 6,912,510 
(the “’510 patent”), 7,149,720 (the “’720 patent”), and 7,725,375 (the “375 
patent”). 
127. ‘479 patent col. 1, ll. 8-10. 
128. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (internal 
citations omitted). 
129. ’479 patent col. 65 ll. 23-50 (“33. A method of exchanging obligations as between 
parties, each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange 
institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined 
obligations, the method comprising the steps of: (a) creating a shadow credit 
record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be held 
independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange institutions; (b) 
obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of day balance for each shadow 
credit record and shadow debit record; (c) for every transaction resulting in an 
exchange obligation, the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party's 
shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that 
do not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of 
the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in 
chronological order; and (d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution 
instructing ones of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the 
credit record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the 
adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being 
irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.”) 
(emphasis added). 
130. ‘720 patent col. 65 ll. 42-61 (“1. A data processing system to enable the exchange 
of an obligation between parties, the system comprising: a data storage unit having 
stored therein information about a shadow credit record and shadow debit record 
for a party, independent from a credit record and debit record maintained by an 
exchange institution; and a computer, coupled to said data storage unit, that is 
configured to (a) receive a transaction; (b) electronically adjust said shadow credit 
record and/or said shadow debit record in order to effect an exchange obligation 
arising from said transaction, allowing only those transactions that do not result in 
a value of said shadow credit record; and (c) generate an instruction to said 
exchange institution at the end of a period of time to adjust said credit record 
and/or said debit record in accordance with the adjustment of said shadow credit 
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containing program code for performing the method for exchanging 
obligations (the computer-readable medium claim).131 
The case began on May 24, 2007 when CLS brought suit against Alice 
seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, patent invalidity, and 
patent unenforceability under the Patent Act. Alice counterclaimed that 
CLS was infringing three of its patents: the ‘479, ‘510, and ‘720 Patents. 
After discovery, CLS moved in March 2009 for summary judgment on the 
basis that (1) any patent infringement by CLS was not occurring in the 
United States, and (2) Alice’s claims lacked patentable subject matter. The 
district court denied CLS’s motion finding that CLS both uses its CLS Core 
System and offers to sell or sells its methods within the US. The case was 
then delayed pending the ruling in Bilski v. Kappos. After that decision was 
handed down, Alice amended its counterclaim to include the ‘375 Patent. 
CLS moved for summary judgment regarding the lack of patentable subject 
matter. After hearing oral arguments on the matter, the district judge ruled 
in favor of CLS finding the patents were directed to ineligible subject 
matter. 
 
A. The Federal Circuit Decision 
 
 After lengthy oral arguments and receiving a plethora of amicus curiae 
briefs, the Federal Circuit could only agree on a one paragraph per curiam 
opinion: 
 
 
record and/or said shadow debit record, wherein said instruction being an 
irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed on said exchange institution.”) 
(emphasis added). 
131. ‘375 patent col. 68, ll. 5-35 (“39. A computer program product comprising a 
computer readable storage medium having computer readable program code 
embodied in the medium for use by a party to exchange an obligation between a 
first party and a second party, the computer program product comprising: program 
code for causing a computer to send a transaction from said first party relating to 
an exchange obligation arising from a currency exchange transaction between said 
first party and said second party; and program code for causing a computer to 
allow viewing of information relating to processing, by a supervisory institution, of 
said exchange obligation, wherein said processing includes (1) maintaining 
information about a first account for the first party, independent from a second 
account maintained by a first exchange institution, and information about a third 
account for the second party, independent from a fourth account maintained by a 
second exchange institution; (2) electronically adjusting said first account and said 
third account, in order to effect an exchange obligation arising from said 
transaction between said first party and said second party, after ensuring that said 
first party and/or said second party have adequate value in said first account and/or 
said third account, respectively; and (3) generating an instruction to said first 
exchange institution and/or said second exchange institution to adjust said second 
account and/or said fourth account in accordance with the adjustment of said first 
account and/or said third account, wherein said instruction being an irrevocable, 
time invariant obligation placed on said first exchange institution and/or said 
second exchange institution.”) (emphasis added). 
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Upon consideration en banc, a majority of the court 
affirms the district court's holding that the asserted 
method and computer-readable media claims are not 
directed to eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
An equally divided court affirms the district court's 
holding that the asserted system claims are not directed to 
eligible subject matter under that statute.132 
 
 The Federal Circuit was otherwise “irreconcilably fractured” with 
regards to any sort of analysis.133 The plurality opinion written by Judge 
Lourie began with a lengthy discussion regarding common law and 
Supreme Court decisions in relation to § 101. He noted a number of 
common themes in Supreme Court decisions in this field including: a 
desire to prevent preemption;134 avoiding overly formalistic test 
approaches;135 and urging a flexible, claim-by-claim approach.136 The 
plurality interpreted Mayo137 to require a court to first “indentif[y] the 
abstract the idea represented in the claim,” and then to determine “whether 
the balance of the claim adds ‘significantly more.’”138 Applying these 
themes and precedent, Judge Lourie found that the asserted method,139 
computer-readable medium,140 and system claims141 of all four patents 
were invalid under § 101. 
A lengthy opinion written by Chief Judge Rader concurred in part and 
dissented in part. He focused on the history of the text of § 101, the scope 
 
132. 717 F.3d at 1273 
133. Id. at 1314 (Moore, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the “court is irreconcilably 
fractured over these system claims and there are many similar cases pending before 
our court and the district courts.”). 
134. Id. at 1280 (“Preemption features prominently in the Supreme Court's recent § 101 
decisions.”). But see 717 F.3d at 1281 (“[T]he proper focus is not preemption per 
se . . . Rather the animating concern is that claims should not be coextensive with a 
natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea; a patent-eligible claim must 
include one or more substantive limitations.”). 
135. Id. at 1281 (“[C]laim drafting strategies that attempt to circumvent the basic 
exceptions to § 101 using, for example, highly stylized language, hollow field-of-
use limitations, or the recitation of token post-solution activity should not be 
credited.”). 
136. Id. at 1281 (“Bright-line rules may be simple to apply, but they are often 
impractical and counterproductive when applied to § 101.”). 
137. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2011). 
138. 717 F.3d at 1286. 
139. Id. at 1286 (“[The] claim lacks any express language to define the computer's 
participation . . . [and t]here is no specific or limiting recitation of essential . . . or 
improved computer technology.”). 
140. Id. at 1288 (“[The computer-readable medium claims] are merely method claims in 
the guise of a device and thus do not overcome the Supreme Court's warning to 
avoid permitting a ‘competent draftsman’ to endow abstract claims with patent-
eligible status.”). 
141. Id. at 1290 (“The computer-based limitations recited in the system claims here 
cannot support any meaningful distinction from the computer-based limitations 
that failed to supply an "inventive concept" to the related method claims.”). 
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of the limited exceptions to the “broad statutory grant” of § 101,142 and 
computer-specific limitations. He agreed with the plurality that the asserted 
method and computer-readable medium claims were directed to ineligible 
subject matter, but found the system claims were not directed to ineligible 
subject matter.143 A second dissent written by Justice Linn disagreed on the 
proper interpretation of the method claims, believing them to be 
misconstrued by the majority and the dissent. 
 
B. The Supreme Court Steps In 
 
 The Supreme Court became involved in the case, hoping to untie the 
Gordian knot left by the Federal Circuit.144 The Court, in a unanimous 
opinion, continued to beat the drum of pre-emption as the driving force of 
the exclusionary principle.145 The Court, like the plurality at the Federal 
Circuit, relied on the framework set forth in Mayo. The framework 
involves two steps: 1) determining whether the claims are directed at a 
patent ineligible concept and, if so, 2) determining what else is in the 
claims (searching for a so-called “inventive concept” or “significantly 
more”.) 
 The Court found that the claims were directed to “the abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement.”146 The Court relied on the Bilski abstract idea 
category to find Alice’s patents an abstract idea as well. Comparing Bilski, 
the Court said that an intermediated settlement is a “fundamental economic 
practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.”147 The Court declined, 
however, to provide any further guidance on what constitutes an abstract 
idea, instead choosing to “not labor to delimit the precise contours of the 
‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”148 
 The Court then continued to the second step of the framework, finding 
that the method claims only required generic computer implementation and 
therefore were not inventive concepts.149 The Court also said that the 
 
142. Id. at 1297. 
143. Id. at 1311 (“[T]he claim recites a machine and other steps to enable transactions . . 
. [and the] "abstract idea" present here is not disembodied at all, but is instead 
integrated into a system utilizing machines.”). 
144. After over 130 pages and seven different opinions, the only thing the majority of 
the court could agree on was two sentences with no consensus on what standard to 
apply. 
145. “’[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to 
impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby thwarting the 
primary object of the patent laws.” 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 
1293). 
146. 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
147. Id. at 2356. 
148. Id. at 2357. See also 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (“It is enough to recognize that there is no 
meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the 
concept of intermediated settlement at issue here. Both are squarely within the 
realm of “abstract ideas” as we have used that term.”). 
149. Id. at 2359 (“[M]ethod claims simply recite the concept of intermediated 
settlement as performed by a generic computer.”). 
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system claims and computer-readable medium claims failed to merit patent 
protection for substantially similar reasons. The Court relied on the logic of 
the patent-eligibility trilogy of cases in reaching this conclusion. 
 Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer, arguing that no business method should qualify as a 
process under § 101. 
 
IV. THE FUTURE? 
 
 When Alice went to the Supreme Court, many commentators hoped the 
Court would provide guidance in this contentious area.150 Reactions to this 
ruling have, however, been decidedly less hopeful,151 occasionally 
bordering on hyperbolic.152 This section will break down the Alice 
decision, examine the Federal Circuit decisions in the wake of Alice, and 
look at Europe’s jurisprudence in this arena. Then it will answer the 
question of why even bother to get a patent when the case law is confusing 
and often contradictory. 
 
A. Understanding Alice 
 
 One of the first steps to understanding this new uncertain future is to 
resolve what the Court is telling us in Alice and what it did not answer. The 
Court provided guidance on what standard should be applied, which fixes 
one of the problems inherent in the Federal Circuit decision in this case. 
 
150. See Roger Parloff, “Supreme Court to Decide when Ideas Become too ‘Abstract’ 
to Patent,” FORTUNE.COM (Mar. 28, 2014 at 9:00 A.M. EST) available at 
http://fortune.com/2014/03/28/supremecourttodecidewhenideasbecometooabstractt
opatent/ (“the fact that even [the Federal Circuit] didn’t have a clue how to 
interpret the Court’s ‘abstract ideas’ precedents conveys the depths of the crisis 
that exists, and the urgency of the need for the Supreme Court to somehow supply 
more guidance this time around.”); Julie Samuels “Hey Supreme Court? It’s Time 
to Take Up Software Patents (Again)” Electronic Frontier Foundation (May 10, 
2013) available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/hey-supreme-court-its-
time-take-software-patents (“The high court should clarify its less-than-helpful 
ruling in Bilski to reinforce that courts and the Patent Office should take § 101 
seriously and strike down (or preferably not allow in the first place) the most 
dangerous and abstract patents.”); Ronald Mann “Argument Preview: Justices have 
Chance to Provide Final Solution to Quandary about Patenting Software” 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 20, 2014) available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argumentpreviewjusticeshavechancetoprovide
finalsolutiontoquandaryaboutpatentingsoftware/.  
151. See Gene Quinn “A Software Patent Setback: Alice v. CLS Bank” IPWATCHDOG 
(Jan. 9 2015) available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/09/a-software-
patent-setback-alice-v-cls-bank/id=53460/; Gene Quinn “Judge Michel says Alice 
Decision ‘Will Create Total Chaos’” IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 6, 2014) available at 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/08/06/judge-michel-says-alice-decision-will-
create-total-chaos/id=50696/. 
152. See Ryan Davis “Alice Kills Thousands of Software Patents, Fed. Circ. Told” LAW 
360 (Sep. 03, 2014 6:49 P.M. EST) available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/573479/alice-kills-thousands-of-software-patents-
fed-circ-told.  
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Going forward, courts will now apply the Mayo framework. This should 
provide some stability to examiners, inventors, lawyers, and judges. 
However, this framework is also fraught with uncertainty. 
 
1. The First Step in the Framework (Ineligible Subject Matter) 
 
 The first step requires determining whether a patent claim is drawn to 
ineligible subject matter. The Court in Alice declined to provide any 
guidance on what constitutes “an abstract idea.” Instead it found the claims 
in Alice to be abstract ideas by analogizing the claims in Bilski that were 
also found to be abstract ideas. Commentators have agreed with the Alice 
decision on the first step in the framework that considered the patents at 
issue to be simply the application of modern computers to an age-old 
system of intermediated settlement.153  
However, the Court took no steps to help outline anything about what 
could make software an “abstract idea.” It went so far as to acknowledge 
that it was not even going to try.154 The language in the claims both in Alice 
and in Bilski does provide some guidance as to when a software patent can 
become “squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as [the Court] has 
used that term.”155 If a patent is drawn to well-known practices and 
contains no meaningful limitations, then the patent will fall within the 
realm of abstract ideas. Some argue that the patents in Alice do contain 
limitations, more specifically the system claims; however, that is not an 
argument that will be delved into in this Note.156 Suffice it to say that 
patents in Alice are akin to the patents in Bilski and are directed to “abstract 
idea” components. 
 The Court took this first part of the framework a step further by 
attempting to lump in all of its previous decisions into the rebranded, 
obscure, and indefinable “abstract idea” exception. No guidance was given 
 
153. See John Duffy “Opinion Analysis: The Uncertain Expansion of Judge-Made 
Exceptions to Patentability” SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 20, 2014 12:46 P.M. EST) 
(“Alice’s patents seemed to be a rather obvious application of fast, modern 
computers to automate very old methods of intermediated settlement”) available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinionanalysistheuncertainexpansionofjudge
madeexceptionstopatentability/; Brian Fung “The Supreme Court’s Decision on 
Software Patents Still Doesn’t Settle the Bigger Question” Washington Post (Jun. 
20, 2014) (“[T]he court struck down what was universally said to be a bad 
patent”). 
154. 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (“[W]e need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the 
“abstract ideas” category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no 
meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the 
concept of intermediated settlement at issue here.”). 
155. 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 
156. See Gene Quinn “A Software Patent Setback: Alice v. CLS” IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 
2015) (“all of the specifically recited structure and tangible components . . . 
unequivocally show that this claim is tethered to a machine . . . [and] the computer 
is also recited as specifically configured.”) available at 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/09/a-software-patent-setback-alice-v-cls-
bank/id=53460/. 
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on interpreting Benson, where a patent involving an algorithm for 
converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form was 
found ineligible, or its progeny in the new Bilski-Mayo-Alice era beyond 
what appears to be lip-service. The Court essentially said, “we found 
abstract ideas there too.” Some commentators go so far as to argue that in 
light of Bilski and Alice, Benson was poorly decided.157 
 The Alice decision refused to resolve the frightening implications it 
created. The Supreme Court has warned against broad interpretation of 
judicially-created exceptions because they could swallow all of patent law, 
yet the Court did not demarcate any limit on these exceptions. It provided 
no guidance beyond, inter alia, if it looks like Bilski/Alice it is an “abstract 
idea.”  
 
2. The Second Step in the Framework (The “Inventive Concept” Step) 
 
The second part of the Bilski/Alice framework is even more confusing. 
The second step asks what more, if anything, the claims add to the abstract 
idea. The mere act of searching for an “inventive concept” or determining 
what is “significantly more” is problematic. The use of the term 
“significant” necessarily injects a level of subjectivity to the test. It raises 
the questions of to what the patent should be compared to and how it 
should be measured to determine if it added more to the law of nature, 
natural phenomena, or abstract idea. The Court set a boundary in Alice, 
relying on the 42-year old logic from Benson: implementation by existing 
computers long in use is not an “inventive concept.” However, this would 
seem to be contradicted by Diehr where the curing process for molding raw 
rubber, an age-old process in itself, implemented by existing computers 
was found patent eligible. The Court distinguished Diehr by relying on the 
fact that it “improved an existing technological process.”158 This reasoning 
raises a number of issues. 
 First, computers by their very nature are used to “improve an existing 
technological process.” The Court provides no guidance on what this term 
means or any limits that should be associated with it. The computers in 
Benson were used to “improve” the “existing process” of converting 
binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals by improving the 
conversion speed, yet the Court held that the patents there were directed to 
ineligible subject matter.  
Second, the Alice Court misconstrued how the Diehr Court went out of 
its way to avoid overruling Benson and Flook. The Court in Diehr focused 
 
157. See Rob Merges “Symposium: Go ask Alice – What can you Patent after Alice v. 
CLS Bank?” SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 20, 2014 12:04 P.M. EST) (“[T]he algorithm in 
Benson did not cover the same kind of thing as the claims in [Bilski and Alice]; and 
it did not cover what it did claim nearly as broadly as the claims in [Bilski and 
Alice].”) available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposiumgoaskalicewhatcanyoupatentaftera
licevclsbank/. 
158. 134 S. Ct. at 2358. 
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instead on the fact that the application was attempting to claim the process 
of curing rubber and not the mathematical formula itself, which it argued 
Benson and Flook were attempting to claim. The problem arises in 
attempting to harmonize the decisions reached in each of those three cases, 
which is why the Federal Circuit had so many problems creating a 
workable standard during the nearly 30 years between Diehr and Bilski.  
Third, the language “existing technological process” would seem to 
conflate § 101 “patentable subject matter” principles and § 103 
“obviousness” principles. The § 103 “obviousness” inquiry focuses on 
whether the invention would be “obvious in light of prior art.”159 Prior art 
consists of any existing information in the public that existed before the 
patent was applied for including: both foreign and domestic granted patents 
and patent applications, scientific research, and items within the general 
knowledge of the general public. In contrast, the § 101 patentable subject 
matter inquiry is focused on whether the invention covers an area that is 
even eligible for patent protection, not whether it is too close to prior art. 
 This framework also recalls a now defunct test from the 1940’s, called 
the “flash of genius” test. This test was created in Cuno Engineering Corp. 
v. Automatic Devices Corp.160 where the Court stated that “the new device, 
however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not 
merely the skill of the calling.”161 This test was rejected a little over a 
decade later when Congress enacted its 1952 provisions to the patent 
statute. Congress instead codified the standard of non-obviousness in § 
103. 
One suggestion made to help solve the problems inherent in the second 
step is to use cited prior art as the basis for comparison. This solution 
would, in effect, turn step two “into a modified prior art analysis.”162 The 
argument goes that if the cited prior art is “more” than an abstract idea and 
the application is “more” than the cited prior art, the application must be 
“significantly more” than an abstract idea. This argument sounds good on 
paper; it would, however, lead to mini-trials within the main trial itself. The 
courts would have to determine that the cited prior art is “more” than an 
abstract idea first before it can rely on the cited prior art finding to lead to 
the “significantly more” conclusion. The mere fact that a patent has been 
granted is not a guarantee that it claims “more” than an abstract idea.163 
 
 
 
159. 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
160. 314 U.S. 84 (1941). 
161. Id. at 91. 
162. John Kong “Surviving §101 Step 2: Is there ‘Significantly More’” IPWatchdog 
(Dec. 21, 2014) available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/12/21/surviving-
%C2%A7101-step-2-is-there-significantly-more/id=52745/.  
163. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (patents claiming computerized intermediated 
settlements directed to an abstract idea); CyberSource, 654 F.3d 1366 (patents for 
detecting internet credit card fraud directed to an abstract idea); DealTracker, 674 
F.3d 1315 (patent for processing a credit application over the internet directed to 
an abstract idea). 
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3. Other Arguments and Issues 
 
One argument raised is that it is unreasonable to judge these claims on 
newly-evolved patent eligibility standards, since the claims were written 16 
years ago when standards were different.164 If patents are to be considered 
a form of property, laws should not be applied retroactively. To judge a 
patent based on a moving target is fundamentally unfair and 
unconscionable. It strips someone of a property right using a new standard 
not in place when the patent was drafted. It is wrong to invalidate claims 
that were drafted during a previous era by using Bilski.  
This argument raises a number of issues. Principally, this argument 
focuses on the fact that these exceptions are judicially created. Judicially-
created exceptions, especially as used by the Supreme Court, are fraught 
with uncertainty. A court must hear the case before it can decide on the 
applicability of the exception. Further, the amount of time it takes for a 
court to hear a case can mean it is years, if not decades, before a final 
decision is handed down. For example, the application at issue in Bilski 
was filed in 1996, but a final decision was not even handed down until 
2010, 14 years later. 
It is also noted that Alice could have been more easily solved using § 
103 and the “obviousness” requirement, thereby avoiding the eligibility 
quandary the Court created.165 The commentator noted this would have 
allowed the Court to rely on the Act enacted by Congress instead of an 
exception created by judges. Surprisingly, the “textualists” of the Court let 
judge-made exceptions control,  going so far as to expand their scope.  
What is completely staggering about the Alice decision is that fact that 
not once in its opinion does the Supreme Court use the word “software.” 
The Supreme Court seems to have deliberately avoided having to decide if 
software is patentable, but this decision could strike at the very heart of 
software patents.166 One commentator noted that IBM’s Watson claims 
may now be patent ineligible under Alice.167 
 
164. See Gene Quinn “A Software Patent Setback: Alice v. CLS” IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 
2015) (“It is difficult to understand why it is fair to be judging these patents based 
on the disclosure standards and patent eligibility standards that have evolved over 
the past several years anyway.”) available at 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/09/a-software-patent-setback-alice-v-cls-
bank/id=53460/.  
165. See John Duffy “Opinion Analysis: The Uncertain Expansion of Judge-Made 
Exceptions to Patentability” SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 20, 2014 12:46 P.M.) available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinionanalysistheuncertainexpansionofjudge
madeexceptionstopatentability/.  
166. See Gene Quinn “A Software Patent Setback: Alice v. CLS” IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 
2015) (“[E]ach of the ways software has been traditionally claimed were ruled to 
result in patent ineligible claims.”) available at 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/09/a-software-patent-setback-alice-v-cls-
bank/id=53460/; Ryan Goellner “Alice Kills: Is Alice v. CLS the Destruction of 
Software and Business Method Patents as We Know Them?” University of 
Cincinnati Law Review (Sep. 30, 2014) (“Requiring [a showing of adequate 
transformation before considering software and business methods to be patentable 
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B. The Federal Circuit Deals with Alice 
 
Since Alice was decided, the Federal Circuit has decided nine cases 
that have grappled with this uncertain new test. The first case was Digitech 
Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc.,168 decided less than a 
month later. The court determined that a patent that described a process of 
combining two data sets into a single data set, the device profile, “claims 
an abstract idea . . . and is not tied to a specific structure or machine.”169 
Therefore, the patent claims constituted ineligible subject matter. The court 
did not provide much guidance here except that it continued to use of the 
machine-or-transformation test, and it said that broad method claims are 
likely abstract ideas. The court did provide some guidance in I/P Engine, 
Inc. v. AOL Inc.170, in a concurring opinion, regarding what might 
constitute “significantly more.” The concurrence emphasized that § 101 
mandates that claims disclose an “advance in science or technology” that is 
“both significant and well-defined.”171 It also emphasized the “give and 
get”172 policy underlying the “technological arts test” as another important 
factor. However, the Federal Circuit rejected the “technological arts test” in 
In re Bilski. 
The Federal Circuit seemed to expand the test for determining 
eligibility in Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC.173 It did this by citing to 
part of the district court opinion that discussed the “pen and paper” test, 
which asks whether the method “consists solely of mental steps which can 
be carried out by a human using pen and paper.”174 Because the patent at 
issue involved managing a game of bingo, which consisted solely of steps 
that a human can do using pen and paper, the patent claimed ineligible 
subject matter. The court relied not only on the fact that the steps could be 
 
subject matter] might extinguish patent protection for software and business 
methods all together.”) available at http://uclawreview.org/2014/09/30/alice-kills-
is-alice-v-cls-the-destruction-of-software-and-business-method-patents-as-we-
know-them/.  
167. See Gene Quinn “A Software Patent Setback: Alice v. CLS” IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 
2015) (“[S]ome of the claims to IBM’s Watson computer . . . seem to be quite 
clearly patent ineligible based on the Alice decision of the Supreme Court.”) 
available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/09/a-software-patent-setback-
alice-v-cls-bank/id=53460.  
168. 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
169. Id. at 1350. The machine section of the machine-or-transformation test continues 
to be a decisive factor. 
170. 576 Fed. Appx. 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
171. Id. at 993. 
172. Id. at 994 (“The give and the get” states that “applicants who make little, if any, 
substantive contribution to the existing body of scientific and technological 
knowledge should not be afforded broad monopoly rights that potentially stifle 
future research and development.”). 
173. Id. at 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
174. Id. at 1007 (internal citations omitted). 
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done by existing computers long in use, but also that the steps could be 
“done mentally.”175 
Going forward, the Federal Circuit has struggled to rectify the opinion 
in the Diehr case with the language from the Alice case.176 Because, under 
Alice, the addition of a “machine” (i.e., a generic computer) by itself does 
not add a patentable limitation (i.e., “significantly more) to an otherwise 
known method or apparatus. The Federal Circuit has attempted to define 
when a machine will impose a meaningful limitation on the scope of the 
claim. The Federal Circuit in Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.177 
relied on language from a case that was pre-Alice to provide some 
guidance, but this language seems to be at odds with the patent in Diehr.178 
In fact, some experts believe that if a Diehr case arose today post-Alice the 
claims would fail the rationale used in Alice.179 
 
1. Ultramercial and Hulu Again Under Alice 
 
The Federal Circuit originally delayed deciding Ultramercial, Inc. v. 
Hulu, LLC180 pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice. The court, on 
the third try, reversed its original holding that Ultramercial’s patents were 
not abstract. The court found the use of commercials as an exchange or 
currency to be an abstract idea, and since the patent merely instructed 
practitioners to implement the idea in a routine manner, it failed the Alice 
test. The court again relied on the machine-or-transformation test, finding 
implementation of the method of distributing copyrighted media products 
over the Internet on a general purpose computer to be a “further reason” 
why the Ultramercial patent did not add “significantly more.” This is the 
 
175. Id. at 1008. 
176. Compare OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more 
accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”) with Diehr where a 
computer was used to more quickly calculate cure times using the Arrhenius 
equation. But see 132 S. Ct. at 2358 where the Court attempted to distinguish 
Diehr by saying that “the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they 
improved an existing technological process, not because they were implemented 
on a computer.” But the improvement in the technological process was because 
they were implemented on a computer to more quickly calculate cure times. 
177. 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
178. Compare 793 F.3d at 1335 (“In order for the addition of a machine to impose a 
meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in 
permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an 
obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., 
through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations.”) (citation 
omitted) with Diehr where the only improvement was the use of a general purpose 
computer that could quickly calculate rubber cure times using the known 
Arrhenius equation. 
179. See David Stein, “The Main Event: Alice v. Diehr” USPTO TALK (Sep. 29, 2014) 
(“Diehr’s claim fails every single criterion and rationale of patent-eligibility that 
courts have construed from Alice.”) available at http://www.usptotalk.com/the-
main-event-alice-v-diehr/.  
180. 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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first time that the Federal Circuit overruled itself using Alice, which shows 
that the Alice framework has expanded the ability of § 101 to invalidate 
abstract idea claims. 
 
2. DDR Forging a Path 
 
 The most important decision to come out of the Federal Circuit 
following Alice is DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P..181 It is the only 
Federal Circuit decision thus far upholding the patentability of computer 
software. DDR was the holder of two patents that claimed systems and 
methods to generate composite web pages, which combined certain visual 
elements of a “host” website with the content of a third-party merchant. 
The court found that the patents claimed eligible subject matter. The court 
distinguished the patents from those in a number of the previous cases 
dealing with computer software because the claims “[did] not merely recite 
the performance of some business practice known from the pre-Internet 
world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet . . . [but 
instead were] necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to 
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer 
networks.”182 As well, the court said that the claims would pass step two of 
the Alice framework because the claims “overr[o]de the routine and 
conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a 
hyperlink.”183 The court focused on the fact that the claims were addressing 
Internet specific problems, but it cautioned against a broad reading of the 
DDR Holdings opinion, stating that “not all claims purporting to address 
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for [a] patent.”184 
 
C. What About Foreign Countries? 
 
Considering the confusing landscape of subject matter eligibility and 
the multiplicity of tests involved, it is helpful to consider the approach 
taken by foreign jurisdictions. Europe has taken a different path than the 
one taken by the United States. The European Patent Convention (“EPC”) 
states that “programs for computers as such” are not patentable 
inventions.185 Europe has a desire to use copyright law in lieu of patents 
and therefore, the European Patent Office (“EPO”) has stated that 
“program listings as such are protected by copyright . . . [and for] a patent 
to be granted for a computer-implemented invention, a technical problem 
 
181. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
182. Id. at 1257. 
183. Id. at 1258. 
184. Id. at 1258. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d 709 (patentee’s argument that the claims 
were directed to the internet-centric challenge of distributing copyrighted material 
over the internet by preventing access to the copyrighted material until the user 
viewed advertising material merely recited the abstract idea of offering content in 
exchange for viewing advertisement along with routine use of the Internet.). 
185. European Patent Convention 15th Edition (Sep. 2013) Article 52. 
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has to be solved in a novel and non-obvious manner.”186 European case law 
obliges the EPO to grant patents for inventions in multiple fields of 
technology where a computer program makes a technical contribution or 
provides a technical effect. If the business method or computer program 
makes a technical contribution or solves a technical problem, then the 
business method or computer program claims patent eligible subject matter. 
China takes a similar approach to Europe. The issue that arises is defining 
the term “technical effect.” One commentator has noted, “No-one has been 
able to provide a stable definition for what the word ‘technical [effect]’ 
actually means in the context of patentability.”187 
 
D. Why Get A Patent? 
 
Academics have spilled much ink on why inventors should patent, 
given the vagaries and the shifting requirements and the shifting opinions 
of the Court.188 One reason is that patents give the inventor broad 
monopolistic rights in his invention. In essence, a patent gives an inventor 
the right to prevent anyone else from using that invention. However, there 
are other protections available to computer program and business method 
inventors. 
One possible route that inventors can take to avoid the formal 
restrictions of patent law is to file for a copyright on their computer 
programs. A copyright establishes legal ramifications for any unauthorized 
copy of the software code. In order to obtain a copyright, the applicant 
must disclose the first 25 and last 25 pages of the source code or the object 
code to the copyright office.189 The applicant may block out sections of the 
code that contain trade secrets.190 This approach is flawed, however, 
because it may allow competitors to inspect the code and reverse-engineer 
a clone.  
Another possible route to protect a software invention would be to 
apply for trade-secret protection. An inventor would not sell the trade 
secret protected program to a customer, but instead license the program to 
an end user. This approach requires a non-disclosure agreement, effectively 
forbidding customers from making disclosures to third parties that relate to 
the program or any documentation of the program. This route to protection 
 
186. European Patent Office “Patents for Software? European Law and Practice” 
EPO.org (last viewed Mar. 15, 2015). 
187. David Pearce, “In Search of a Technical Effect” Tufty the Cat Blog (Nov. 1, 2013) 
available at http://tuftythecat.blogspot.com/2013/11/in-search-of-technical-
effect.html.  
188. See John Villasenor “Why Patents and Copyright Protections are More Important 
than Ever” Scientific American (Nov. 14, 2013); Joe Hadzima “The Importance of 
Patents: It Pays to Know Patent Rules” MIT (last viewed Mar. 15, 2015) available 
at http://web.mit.edu/e-club/hadzima/pdf/the-importance-of-patents.pdf.  
189. United States Copyright Office “Copyright Registration for Computer Programs” 
(Circular 61) (Aug. 2012) p. 2 
190. Id. at 3 
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also has some problems. Non-disclosure agreements contain arduous terms 
to both negotiate and enforce. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 In the end, the question becomes: should software and business 
methods be patent eligible at all? The second question is who should decide 
if software and business methods are patentable? The answer to the first 
question is yes. A blanket ban on eligibility would be disastrous. The 
purpose of patent law is to drive innovation. Preventing protection of 
software inventions deters innovation because the government will not 
protect those creations. However, an open door policy for eligibility would 
be just as disastrous, because software and business methods, like other 
inventions, need eligibility constraints, or patent law will be used to 
constrain the very innovations it seeks to protect. 
 One idea raised earlier in this Note is that § 103 could be used to 
determine eligibility for software and business methods, rather than the 
obscure and often confusing § 101 test and its “abstract idea” exception to 
subject matter eligibility. Looking to see if a claim is obvious under § 103 
first would allow courts to side step the hornet’s nest that § 101 analysis 
has become. The § 103 analysis has a number of inquiries: 1) the scope and 
content of the prior art, 2) differences between prior art and the claims at 
issue, and 3) the level or ordinary skill in the pertinent art.191 The Court has 
been noted for conflating § 101 with the other statutory bars to 
patentability, including § 102, § 103, and § 112, when it considers subject 
matter that touches upon the eligibility exceptions it created.192 This can be 
seen in both Alice and the case that originated the framework used in Alice. 
The Mayo test, which was applied in Alice, was merely the latest 
continuation of this conflation, more specifically in the second step of the 
framework.193 The second step asks whether there is an “inventive 
concept” which closely resembles the language “inventive step” which is 
 
191. The so-called “Graham factors” which came from the case Graham et al. v. John 
Deere Co. of Kansas City et al. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
192. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J dissenting) (“[The Court] strikes what 
seems to me an equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by 
importing into its inquiry under 35 U. S. C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and 
inventiveness. Section 101 is concerned only with subject-matter patentability. 
Whether a patent will actually issue depends upon the criteria of §§ 102 and 103, 
which include novelty and inventiveness, among many others.”). 
193. See Gene Quinn, “Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. 
Prometheus,” IPWatchdog (Mar. 20, 2012) (“The Supreme Court also further 
specifically ignored the Government’s objective, reasonable, and until today 
correct assertion that any step beyond a statement of a law of nature transforms the 
claim into one that displays patent eligible subject matter, with issues of whether 
those steps are known to be properly resolved by 102 and 103.”) available at 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-v-
prometheus/id=22920/.  
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used by the much of the world as the equivalent to the § 103 
requirement.194 
This method would prove helpful in the field of software and business 
methods, because the patents and applications the courts have rejected have 
been, by and large, well-known techniques that just include the add-on of 
using a computer.  This idea is unlikely to occur, however, for a number of 
reasons. First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held § 101 to be a 
threshold test that must be met before considering the other patentability 
requirements.195 Second, it would require discovery, which would use 
judicial resources and time, requiring longer periods for these trials and 
further clogging the courts. Third, this solution has an application issue. If 
using § 103 first is applied to only software and business method claims, it 
would require the court to determine that the claims were drawn to that 
subject matter before the court allows discovery to determine § 103 
nonobviousness. 
 The second question, who should decide whether software and 
business methods are patentable in general, is also a difficult one to answer. 
The Supreme Court has avoided any attempt to set clear boundaries or lay 
down guidelines. From the beginning, the Court has considered itself “not 
competent to speak” on when patent laws should be extended.196 It has 
reiterated this incapacity to this day, except when it extended a judicial 
exception to subject matter eligibility, which further obfuscated the field. 
 The USPTO released interim guidelines following the Alice decision, 
hoping to provide some sort of guidance.197 The guidelines lead examiners 
through the Alice framework and list a number of factors that constitute 
“significantly more.” These guidelines, however, do not provide much 
actual assistance, as they merely recite language used by the Court in 
previous decisions involving “abstract ideas.”198 
 
194. See Dan L. Burk “The Inventive Concept in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,” Max 
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 866 (Nov. 25, 2014) (“Typically 
the ‘‘inventive step’’ requirement, which is found in many patent systems, 
including as Art. 52 of the European Patent Convention, is considered equivalent 
to the ‘‘non-obviousness’’ requirement found in Sec. 103.”) available at 
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/burk/burk-inventive-concept-in-
alicecorp-iic-2014.pdf.   
195. See 561 U.S. at 602 (“The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is . . . a threshold test.”). 
196. 409 U.S. at 72. 
197. “2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility” 79 FR 74618 (Dec. 
16, 2014) 
198. See 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility” 79 FR at 74624 
(Examples of “significantly more” include: “Improvements to another technology 
or technical field;” “Improvements to the functioning of the computer itself;” 
“Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine;” 
“Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or 
thing;” “Adding a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine 
and conventional in the field, or adding unconventional steps that confine the claim 
to a particular useful application;” or “Other meaningful limitations beyond 
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological 
environment.”). 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 7 · 2016  
Alice: The Status Quo or Total Chaos 
152 
 The time has come for Congress to step into the fray. Congress needs 
to incorporate the judicially-created exceptions to subject matter eligibility 
into the Patent Act and it needs to lay out some clearer boundaries. The 
Court’s ambiguous approach has only led to confusion. The entire language 
of § 101 defining eligible subject matter is “[w]hoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this.”199 Noticeably 
absent is any mention, or even acknowledgement, of the three judicially-
created exceptions which act to bar any ability to patent an invention. 
Congress needs to incorporate into the Patent Act these three exceptions, 
which have existed untethered to any meaningful definitions, especially the 
“abstract idea” exception. The Court continues to plead its incapacity to 
provide any sort of meaningful definitions, as it lacks personal scientific 
knowledge to make informed definitions.200 This acknowledgement of lack 
of knowledge is especially concerning, because the Federal Circuit, as 
mandated by Alice, has been applying the § 101 analysis before claim 
construction has even begun.201  
As well, unlike Congress, the Court is limited to only being able to 
make decisions based on the cases that are brought before it. Congress, on 
the other hand, can call experts, create committees to study the technology, 
and consider the technology as a whole before attempting to create 
meaningful definitions for these broad exceptions. As well, Congress is 
better suited to respond more quickly to the rapid advances of technology 
as compared to the Court. Court decisions in patent law often take decades 
before any definition is provided. Then that definition retroactively applies 
to all applications no matter how drastically that definition may alter the 
boundaries of the subject matter exceptions or their method of 
enforcement. 
The complex subjective test left in the wake of Alice will continue to 
cause turmoil for courts, inventors, attorneys, and examiners until further 
clear guidance is given. Until this happens, we can expect years of 
confusion for courts, examiners, inventors, and lawyers regarding the 
subject matter eligibility for computer implemented inventions akin to the 
confusion that occurred in the thirty years between Diehr and Bilski. 
 
199. 35 U.S.C. § 101 
200. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (Justice Scalia 
explicitly acknowledging his inability to understand the “fine details of molecular 
biology” because of a lack expertise in “[his] own knowledge or even [his] own 
belief.”). 
201. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 
1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[C]laim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite 
to a validity determination under § 101.”); 788 F.3d at 1359 (Mayer, J., 
concurring) (“Failure to recite statutory subject matter is the sort of ‘basic 
deficiency,’ that can, and should, be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure 
of time and money by the parties and the court.”) (citations omitted) 
